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Abstract   While most of the attention in the scientific and policy literature on
rights-based institutions has been devoted to Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs), there are alternatives that involve different configurations of use rights.
One such alternative is a space-based option commonly referred to as Territo-
rial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs). TURFs have been utilized in island fisheries
off Southeast Asia for decades, and they have been well studied, particularly by
anthropologists and sociologists. This paper discusses case studies of TURF or-
ganizations in Japan and Chile from an economics perspective. We discuss the
historical origins of each system, outline the legal and institutional structures of
the systems, and then discuss how each system manages nearshore coastal re-
sources. We discuss similarities and differences across the many specific collective
management structures adopted by Japanese and Chilean TURF organizations.
We then discuss how outcomes differ from what might emerge under ITQs.
Key words   Collective management, resource management, rights-based fish-
ery management, TURFs.
JEL Classification Code   Q22.
Introduction
Since the earliest experiments in Iceland and New Zealand with rights-based fisher-
ies policies, most of the literature and policy attention has been devoted to
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). At the same time, there has been resistance
to wholesale adoption of ITQs in many countries, for reasons that are both spurious
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and substantive. ITQs have been subject to a fairly constant din of criticism by skep-
tics since they were first proposed as a scheme for rationalizing fisheries in the
1970s. Early skeptics acknowledged that ITQs had promise to reduce common prop-
erty waste, but doubted that the transactions costs of enforcing and administering
such a radical change could ever be overcome. But even as enforcement and admin-
istrative infrastructures were being successfully developed and implemented in
Iceland and New Zealand, new doubts were expressed over the breadth of settings
within which they might successfully operate. The highly cited Copes’ critique of-
fered many reasons why we might expect ITQs to fail in practice, including data
fouling, black market off-loading, and high-grading, among others (Copes 1986).
As experience has accumulated, most of the Copes’ critiques have proven un-
founded. ITQs have been adopted in a variety of biological, technological, and
institutional settings, and there have been no notable failures to improve fisheries
economic efficiency or sustainability and ease of management, compared with status
quo regimes (Arnason 1993; Pascoe 1993; Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr 2005).
More recent criticism of ITQs has focused on the distributional aspects associated
with the actual rents that have been generated. The Icelandic Supreme Court chal-
lenge to Iceland’s ITQ system is a case in point, but not the only case that has
focused on perceived fairness of the actual distribution of quota rents. The “fair-
ness” issue cuts across various concerns, including the fairness of excluding some
bona fide fishermen in the initial allocations, the fairness of granting initial wealth
to original participants, and the fairness associated with inevitable structural
changes that often shift centers of processing and secondary impacts (e.g., Matulich
and Sever 1999).
Regardless of the source or veracity of the criticisms, ITQs have attracted de-
tractors as well as ardent supporters. As experience with ITQs accumulates, it is
important to reflect on the nature of their strengths and weaknesses, and to synthe-
size some consensus over the kinds of settings in which they have been most
successful. This paper takes a step in that direction but in a roundabout way, by ex-
amining some fisheries that are successfully managed but in which ITQs have not
been used. In particular, we focus on Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs).
These systems are best contrasted with ITQs because, within the context of rights-
based management, they involve collective and coordinated decision making. Our
discussion is mostly anecdotal at this stage, summarizing initial findings from ongo-
ing survey work that is aiming to understand in some detail how TURFs operate, the
biological and socioeconomic settings they operate within, and strengths and weak-
nesses as institutions. In the end, studying fisheries in which collective rather than
individual rights have been granted helps fill out our intuition and test various eco-
nomic hypotheses about how rights-based systems mitigate the problems of open
access and the race to fish.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some of the basic
characteristics of TURF systems, and the following section presents the specific set-
tings in which they have evolved in Japan and Chile. We then discuss what TURFs
can do that ITQs fail to do and provide specific examples drawn from empirical
analyses undertaken in both Japan and Chile. Finally, the last section sets forth the
lessons derived from our analyses.
TURF Management Systems in Japan and Chile
TURFs have been widely implemented in nearshore coastal fisheries of Japan and
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by local Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCAs). In order to collectively manage
the fisheries within their TURFs, members of FCAs have further spontaneously sub-
divided into smaller and more specialized Fishery Management Organizations
(FMOs). FMOs typically manage single-species fisheries within the larger TURF.
Fisheries managed by FMOs include sedentary and mobile species, using gear that
spans everything from diving to bottom trawls. In Chile, the nearshore coast is also
divided into TURFs managed by local fishermen’s organizations that are responsible
for using and managing the resources within each TURF. The Chilean TURF system
is divided into spatial units that are locally called Management and Exploitation Ar-
eas of Benthic Resources (MEAs) (González 1996; Montecinos 2000).1
There are several common aspects in the Japanese and Chilean systems. Both
begin with well-defined spatial units (TURFs) that clearly delineate spatial zones in
the nearshore coastal environment. In both systems, exclusive access rights are
granted to well-defined groups of fishermen associated with local fishermen’s coop-
eratives. Finally, in both systems, fishermen self-manage by implementing and
enforcing various strategies, generally guided by overarching federal-level con-
straints and targets. Of particular importance from a research perspective, each
system contains hundreds of relatively autonomous collective management institu-
tions, each of which has developed its own practices that fit local conditions, the
make-up of the group of users, and historical preconditions. This breadth of institu-
tional evolution presents a large amount of variation with which to study factors that
determine or hinder success of various collective management institutions.
While the two systems have elements in common, their historical experiences
and institutional maturity levels are quite different. For example, the Japanese
TURF system has its origins in institutions that were developed in the feudal era
some centuries ago. The Japanese system is thus very mature, and it has evolved
slowly in a bottom-up manner (Makino and Sakamoto 2002). In contrast, the Chil-
ean TURF system was introduced recently (in the early 1990s) by the national
government in response to evidence of management failure in the shellfish fisheries
(Castilla 1994; González 1996; Castilla et al. 1998; Bernal et al. 1999; Meltzoff,
Lichtensztajn, and Stotz 2002; Gelcich et al. 2005). The Chilean system is still un-
dergoing rapid evolution and change.
The scientific information necessary to manage both systems is gathered and
disseminated via partnerships between the TURFs and federal agencies responsible
for their oversight. Both systems devolve responsibilities for management to local
fishermen organizations, but both are constrained by Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
limits and conservation guidelines that are set at the federal level. In the Japanese
system, local extension scientists play a liaison role between FCAs and the federal
government, conducting science that informs setting of TACs and monitoring perfor-
mance in order to ensure sustainable resource use. In Chile, federal regulatory
agencies set TAC limits, size limits, and gear restrictions which then are self-en-
forced and managed at the local level. Resource health and stock status are
evaluated yearly for each MEA by consultant biologists, and the information is used
by the federal regulators to modify regulations where necessary.
In the next sections, we elaborate on events behind the creation and evolution of
TURFs in Japan and Chile, and then discuss the structure and operations of FMOs
and MEAs and the manner in which they self-manage the resources within their re-
spective TURFs.
1 The MEA acronym strictly refers to the seabed area that is managed by a fisher’s organization. We use
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Evolution of TURFs in Japan
TURFs are the dominant form of fisheries institution governing Japan’s extensive
near-shore fisheries. Access rights within each TURF are managed and coordinated
by local Fishery Cooperative Associations that have been historically associated
with the coastal zone encompassed within the TURF. The Japanese system consists
of some 1,600+ FCAs with TURFs.2
The Japanese fisheries management system is hierarchical and begins with legal
rights to coastal resources that are held at the federal level on behalf of the public.
The federal government sets broad management policies, particularly biologically
determined TACs, some gear prohibitions, minimum size limits, and season length
restrictions. The science backing these biologically motivated objectives is partially
decentralized to scientists at research stations at the prefecture level (equivalent to
states in size). The central government sets the overarching regulations and devolves
use rights for near-shore coastal fishery resources to the groups of local community
fishermen organized in FCAs (Makino and Matsuda 2005).
The historical details of FCAs and TURF evolution have been documented in
the literature (Asada, Hirasawa, and Nagasaki 1983; Ruddle 1987; Yamamoto 1995;
Makino and Sakamoto 2002); here we present them briefly. FCAs in Japan have
their origins in fishermen’s guilds formed in the 16th century. In the feudal period,
coastal villages that did not have enough arable land to grow rice were the only commu-
nities allowed to fish. For these villages, fishing was the only source of their livelihood,
and they were given specified areas of nearshore coastal water for their exclusive use.
To protect these areas against outside poachers, fishermen’s groups formed guilds that
asserted territorial rights over coastal water adjacent to the villages. These ad hoc
use rights were given formal legal status as TURFs in 1901 with the enactment of
the Fishery Law. Later, in 1948, the Fishery Cooperative Law transformed the guilds
into FCAs, and granted them status to represent user groups within the TURFs.
Since FCAs are typically associated with the marine ecosystems that have been
historically used off corresponding coastal communities, each FCA often encom-
passes a large number of diverse fisheries. FCAs are generally granted responsibility
for managing all of the fishery resources within their jurisdictions. These resources
may include sedentary shellfish fisheries like clams, mussels, sea urchin, and aba-
lone, as well as mobile species like shrimp. They also include moderately mobile
groundfish, including various flatfish and rockfish, and more mobile fish like mack-
erel and herring. Typical FCAs in Japan often encompass a wide range of gear types
including dredges, gillnets, seines, and small trawls. They also include fisheries
prosecuted by divers.
Evolution of TURFs in Chile
The Chilean coast is a particularly rich source of benthic resources that are impor-
tant both economically and socially to coastal communities. The Chilean shellfish
fishery targets more than 40 species, which constitute the main economic resource
for many small-scale fishery organizations. Among the most valuable shellfish spe-
cies is the so-called Chilean abalone or loco. Divers pry the loco from rocky habitat
and they are then collected by local buyers and shipped mainly to the lucrative Tai-
wanese and Japanese markets. In addition to loco, Chilean near-shore fisheries also
2 From the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives Associations website: www.zengyoren.or.jp/
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include sea urchin and limpets. Both species are harvested by divers and also ex-
ported primarily to Taiwan and Japan.
In the early 1980s, the sharp rise in demand for shellfish, mainly from foreign
consumers following Chile’s economic liberalization, led to a dramatic uncontrolled
increase in harvest and a rapid decline in stocks (Bustamante and Castilla 1987). After
the failure of traditional command-and-control regulations, a new Chilean Fishery and
Aquaculture Law (CFAL) was implemented in 1991. This regulatory framework
sought to rehabilitate shellfish stocks damaged during the export boom and to en-
sure the rational, sustainable exploitation of fishery resources (Castilla 1994).
The CFAL was a bold, forward-looking piece of legislation with two major in-
novations. First, it resolved contentious conflicts over access to fishing grounds
between the small-scale and the industrial (company-owned) fleets by assigning an
exclusive fishing area within five miles from the shore to the small-scale local fish-
ermen. Secondly, the law introduced limited entry/access rights management tools
by establishing spatially delineated Individual Nontransferable Fishing Quotas
(INFQs) within numerous local zones known as Benthic Regime of Extraction
(BRE) (Bernal et al. 1999; Castilla and Defeo 2001; Leiva and Castilla 2002).
The individual quota system within the spatial system of BREs was imple-
mented at a national scale between 1993 and 1999, mainly in the loco fishery. This
tool required a strong monitoring and enforcement effort directed at the fishermen
and at pre-established landing sites and processing plants (Bernal et al. 1999;
Castilla and Defeo 2001; Leiva and Castilla 2002). While forward looking and bold,
the individual quota/BRE system collapsed under the inability to monitor harvests
and appropriately enforce the individual-based quota landings system (Leiva and
Castilla 2002). Chile’s extremely long coastline, coupled with the isolation of many
areas and poverty, resulted in a system that was essentially impossible to enforce
even with the best of intentions.
In an attempt to overcome the quota system’s main limitations while retaining
the TURF features of the BREs, a refinement that devolved control and enforcement
to local groups, rather than individuals, was implemented in the late 1990s. This
system is currently in place. Chile’s locally controlled collective management sys-
tem builds, as does Japan’s, on historically important harvester communities that
have dominated the coastal system. The fisheries off most Chilean caletas3 are orga-
nized by members of fishermen’s unions, called sindicatos. Alternatively, fisheries
may be managed by other important local fishermen’s organizations, including trade
unions and cooperatives. These three types of organizations have operated for de-
cades and have played a key role in the implementation of TURFs (Castilla and
Fernández 1998; Castilla et al. 1998). When the new TURF system was formed, the
local organizations became a vehicle for identifying the class of potential partici-
pants and for motivating locally oriented leadership under the new system.
TURF-based Fishery Co-management: FMOs and MEAs
In Japan, the FCAs have inherited a strong historical sense of ownership over the
resources within their TURFs. This has, in turn, paved the way for the intensifica-
tion of collective management within the TURFs, above and beyond the level of
management dictated by federal TAC, size limit, and gear restrictions. The intensi-
fied collective management is carried out with FMOs within each TURF. FMOs are
3 Caletas are sites usually located around coastal coves that serve as operational bases for local small-
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generally subsets of fishermen within FCAs, often defined by target species and/or
gear group. They have often formed in response to declining fish stocks, depressed
ex-vessel prices, and excessive competition within a TURF. Most FMOs are thus af-
filiates of their parent FCAs, and they inherit the benefits of established TURFs and
limited entry of new members. Federal agencies offer support for FMOs per their re-
quest, but unlike Chile, there are no mandatory reports and oversight by technical
consultants (see details below). The decentralized operation of FCAs is also inher-
ited in the operation of FMOs. The number of FMOs has increased since the
government began recording their statistics in 1988, with the most recent count be-
ing 1,608 as of 2003 (MAFF 2006).
The Chilean counterparts of FCAs and FMOs evolved in a somewhat different
manner. The Chilean TURF system assigns permanent management rights to groups
of fishermen that have self-organized and been legally sanctioned to co-manage
their MEA. Fishers’ organizations must successfully develop exploitation plans that
are consistent with federal biological guidelines and then exploit the resource coop-
eratively. The government imposes closed seasons and minimum harvest sizes
designed to ensure that groups do not overexploit the resource (González 1996;
Castilla et al. 1998; Bernal et al. 1999; Castilla and Defeo 2001; Leiva and Castilla
2002). Another distinctive feature of the MEA system, in comparison to the Japa-
nese system, is that government officials monitor fishery status through mandatory
technical consultant’s reports (SUBPESCA 2000). The first MEAs were established
in 1997, and there are now about 300 actively engaged MEAs along the 4,600+ km
long Chilean coastline.
Both MEAs and FMOs are allowed considerable latitude to establish their own
internal management schemes with which to direct the fisheries within their respec-
tive TURFs. In Chile, the large variation in ecosystem types, biological productivity,
access to markets, and opportunity costs of participants has led to correspondingly
large variations in internal methods used to manage and monitor each MEA. Japa-
nese nearshore ecosystems witness the same kinds of variations but, in addition,
typically involve a larger and more diverse number of targeted species and fishing
gear. The spectrum of internal self-management methods involved is broad in both
systems. Some areas and fisheries have not progressed much beyond an unregulated
race to fish among the (closed) group of participants. Others have adopted extremely
time- and effort-intensive rules of use.4 Some of the innovations in cooperative man-
agement and coordination are described in later sections.
Basic Characteristics of FMOs and MEAs
We now examine some of the often presumed necessary conditions for successful
collective management of common property resources, and fishery resources in particu-
lar (e.g., Olson 1965; Christy 1982; Ostrom 1990; Pintassilgo and Duarte 2000). These
include small membership size, targeted species type, and membership control.
Membership Size
One of the most widely mentioned attributes for successful collective management
is size, such that the smaller the group size, the better the anticipated chance of suc-
cess, ceteris paribus. According to the 1998 Fishery Census, 47.3% of FMOs in
4 Information is based on the authors’ fieldwork.TURFs and ITQs 397
Japan had membership sizes of 30 or less, while 17.2% of FMOs had 100 members
or more. The trend is toward smaller FMOs (Lou and Ono 2001). Based on the re-
cently conducted survey by the authors, the average FMO membership size is 53.
Chilean MEAs have slightly larger membership sizes; at the national level the aver-
age is 62, with a range of 25 to 890.5 Within the most intensively managed Fourth
and Fifth Chilean Administrative Regions,6 the MEA membership size ranges from
25 to 440, with an average of 80.7
Although the tendency is toward formation of co-management groups that are
reasonably small, the correlation of size with the success of fishery collective man-
agement is still unclear. For example, a small pink shrimp fishery FMO in Suruga
Bay, Japan, known for its enduring success, has 120 members, while a surf clam
fishery FMO in northern Fukushima prefecture is struggling to sustain the organiza-
tion with 18 members. In the Chilean case, there are MEAs with more than 150
members located in rural areas that are successfully managing their resources, while
others with 30 or fewer members located close to relatively poor towns are obtain-
ing very poor results.8
Targeted Species Type
Japanese FMOs target a variety of species. According to our recent survey, the ma-
jority of surveyed FMOs (77 out of 116) targeted sedentary species, such as clams
and abalone. Nineteen FMOs targeted spiny lobster, followed by 14 FMOs targeting
moderately mobile groundfish, and 6 FMOs targeting migratory species, such as
mackerel and bonito.
The Chilean MEA system was designed primarily to regulate benthic fisheries
that are relatively sedentary, spatially structured, and mostly exploited by small-
scale fishermen. The main species exploited under the MEA system are loco,
limpets, sea urchins, pink clams, and scallops. Seaweed extraction is also important.
Official records indicate that about 80%, 60%, and 50% of the MEAs have loco,
limpets, and sea urchin, respectively, among their targeted species.
These observations are consistent with the claim that less mobile, less migratory
species are more suitable for co-management, especially those based on TURFs
(Christy 1982). However, the sedentary species/success hypothesis may be con-
founded with another equally important correlate, namely that many targeted
sedentary species are also highly valuable. Chile’s loco is certainly valuable; popu-
lar targeted species in Japan, such as spiny lobster, abalone, and scallops, also
obtain higher prices. In fact, many MEAs and FMOs appear to focus much of their
effort on collective marketing activities of the products they harvest.
Controlling Entry of New Members
To be successful, fishery management based on FCAs and MEAs requires the con-
trol of entry. If entry is left uncontrolled, then the so-called “new member problem”
5 Based on unpublished data provided to the authors from SUBPESCA. Twenty-five members is the re-
quired minimum to form a sindicato.
6 The Fourth and Fifth Regions are located in the central zone of Chile. In the early development stages of the
TURF system, fishermen’s organizations located in these regions showed a high interest in implementing this
tool. In these regions, there is also relatively more available information from government sources.
7 Information based on authors’ fieldwork in Chile.
8 Information based on authors’ fieldwork in Japan and Chile.Cancino, Uchida, and Wilen 398
will undermine stability (Pintassilgo and Duarte 2001). The Japanese Fishery Coop-
erative Law prohibits FCAs from rejecting eligible individuals seeking to join them
(Article 25). The eligibility condition is that an individual must be a working fisher-
man, defined by (i) his/her local residency, and (ii) a minimum annual number of
days engaged in commercial fishing. Since an individual cannot engage in commer-
cial fishing without being a member of local FCA, new membership seekers must be
hired by the incumbent fishermen in order to fulfill the minimum-days condition.
FCA members can thus effectively prevent potential new members to becoming eli-
gible by moderating their use of new labor (Uchida 2004a).
The Chilean legislation also prohibits fishermen’s organizations from rejecting
individuals seeking to join them. Since the organizations are allowed to establish
their own internal regulations, however, practices have evolved that serve as entry
barriers. For example, many request up-front payments from potential new members
to have access to the MEA’s benefits. In some cases, new members are also required
to work for a certain period of time (usually six months) without pay before being
eligible to receive their share of the MEA’s benefits. These internal regulations al-
low MEAs to control entry of new members.
What Can TURF Systems Do That ITQs Fail to Do?
Economic theory suggests some reasons why ITQs might not achieve full potential,
and many of these were elucidated by Copes (1986). Because ITQs decentralize de-
cision making, any situation in which residual externalities remain are axiomatically
failing to achieve rent maximization. In this section, we discuss some of the limita-
tions of ITQs that might be addressed by a well-designed TURF system.
A fundamental observation that should be emphasized is that, while the granting
of an allocation to a group is a necessary condition for avoiding common property
overexploitation and rent dissipation, it is not sufficient. This is because the simple
allocation to a group does nothing to eliminate the inherent race-to-fish incentives
faced by the individual members of the closed class. These individual race-to-fish
incentives are eliminated or mitigated when quotas are distributed to individuals in
ITQ systems, but a TURF must manage the inherent incentives if group allocation is
to successfully generate returns. Given that allocations are initially vested in the
group, it must devise means to make and enforce internal decisions that govern the
coordination and success of group operation. The range of designs that potentially
might be used to manage these functions is wide, from schemes that lease out allo-
cations and simply collect rents, to others that finely prescribe behavior of
participants in order to achieve various efficiency and distributional objectives. In
the next subsections, we describe some of the key aspects that ITQs fail to take into
account but that are properly addressed by TURFs.
Spatial Allocation of Effort
ITQs that are allocated across whole fisheries, or across the broad range of a
population’s home range, are not capable of accounting for spatial heterogeneity.
This heterogeneity is important in most fisheries, and quite important in some. It
may arise out of the essential patchiness of resources, spatial productivity differ-
ences, or spatial profit differences associated with the location of ports and
distribution facilities (Sanchirico and Wilen 1999). Regardless of the origin, spatial
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profitable patches are relatively overexploited, in spite of the generic incentives pro-
vided by ITQs to maximize value.
In Japan, some FMOs coordinate their members’ fishing effort with the aim of
mitigating inefficient allocation of effort over space (Gaspart and Seki 2003; Baba
1991; Uchida 2004b). In order to eliminate the race to fish and congestion at hot
spots, some FMOs rotate access to fishing grounds on a daily (or longer time inter-
val) basis. The rotation pattern may be predetermined, or it may be continuously
directed by a collective decision-making body consisting of FMO member represen-
tatives. FMOs with too many members for a given resource stock or fishing ground
may also take turns fishing in addition to rotating the fishing grounds.
In practice, effort coordination and rotation schemes designed to optimize spa-
tial effort distributions should lead to differential catch rates across coop members.
If this differential is not mitigated, it has the potential to undermine the very exist-
ence of FMOs. Japanese FMOs handle this distributional consequence of effort
assignments in two ways. First, they may rotate fishing opportunities so that assign-
ments rotate over hot spots and cold spots in some regular way. The pollock fishery
FMO in Hokkaido operates in this manner, and its rotation scheme is so complicated
that it has three layers of rotation. The end result is that throughout the season, each
vessel has an equal chance of harvesting in any given fishing ground. Second, FMOs
may pool income and distribute total proceeds back to fishermen. Gaspart and Seki
(2003) view income pooling as an important device that supports effort coordina-
tion, since with a pooling arrangement everyone receives an equal amount
regardless of the place he/she was assigned.
Similar management schemes are in place in Chilean MEAs. There are two gen-
eral methods for allocating the MEA-specific TAC among members, each of which
has ramifications in terms of basic incentives as well as for distribution. One promi-
nent method is simply to evenly apportion the total MEA-specific TAC among
production units.9 Some MEAs take the next step by collectively managing the tem-
poral and spatial application of effort, distributing proceeds to their members via a
pooling arrangement. Whether this step is taken seems to depend heavily on transac-
tions costs, which encompass factors including group size, leadership, education,
isolation, alternative income, etc.10 Other MEAs allow individual production units to
fish their specific allocation over time and space as they wish, but pay the produc-
tion units according to the quality (generally size) of the product they harvest. Both
schemes effectively set up within-MEA individual quota systems, which remove
some of the incentives to race for fish. Still other MEAs leave the MEA-specific
TAC unallocated, but distribute proceeds to members via a pooling arrangement.
These schemes are often combined with a rotating effort assignment plan that equal-
izes work burden and spreads effort spatially in a more efficient manner. In some
cases of rotating harvest systems, piece-rate schemes are also used to take advantage
of divers’ different skill levels and to promote effort (discourage shirking).11
In terms of larger-scale spatial effort coordination, there are instances in which
Japanese FMOs have coordinated with neighboring FMOs, and some cases where
they merged. This has happened when neighboring FCAs share a population that, for
example, moves across boundaries over its yearly cycle. In the small pink shrimp
9 A production unit typically consists of a diver, two crew members, a vessel, and gear.
10 An illuminating case study that illustrates an intertemporal externality not resolved by an ITQ system,
and the somewhat unsuccessful attempt to manage that residual externality collectively, is in Bisack and
Sutinen (2006).
11 Under either allocation method, usually a fee is taken to pay for the baseline studies, the yearly direct
biological assessments, and organization’s activities, which may include marketing, effort administra-
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fishery in Suruga Bay, shrimp move from south to north between adjacent FCAs during
the year, gaining size and weight and market value in the process. Disputes arose be-
cause fishermen from the southern FMO took the shrimp before they were large enough
to maximize value. The solution was to merge the two FMOs and operate over the two
regions jointly, with most harvest taken in the northern FMO after the merger.
In Chile, the legislation does not allow MEAs to formally merge. There are in-
stances, however, in which fishermen’s organizations from different MEAs work
jointly to make decisions about harvest timing, and then collectively market their
products to export buyers. These are some examples that highlight the potential for
spatially organized TURF systems to achieve efficient spatial effort allocation, not
only within an FMO or MEA, but across them if necessary.
Self-monitoring, Enforcement, and Sanctions
Self-governance based on peer pressure constitutes the basic principle of monitoring
and enforcement in FMOs and MEAs. In FMOs, monitoring may literally be
achieved by peer pressure, or a committee of member representatives may undertake
monitoring and enforcement tasks. Some FMOs explicitly specify sanction proce-
dures, such as confiscation of harvest and prohibition of fishing by violators. FMOs
with pooling arrangements may punish the violators by reducing their distribution
shares.
Chilean MEAs have also implemented a system of explicit graduated sanctions
according to the severity and context of the fault. These sanctions are mostly pecu-
niary, aimed at addressing shirking problems and, in extreme cases, include the
expulsion of the member from the organization. Most MEAs have implemented spe-
cial committees, constituted on a rotating basis of three or four members of the
organization, who are in charge of applying the sanctions. The fact that all members
agree on the sanctions also helps to keep non-compliance at a low level.
Multi-species Management and Habitat Enhancement
Other reasons that might lead ITQs to be less than fully efficient are externalities
associated with multi-species interactions. Since most programs grant ITQs to indi-
vidual species, there is generally little attention paid to interaction among species.
In principle, these could be handled at the decision point of setting TACs, and, in
principle, it might even be possible for ITQ holders to negotiate with each other over
multi-species linkages. In practice, however, predator-prey and other “ecosystem ef-
fects” are generally not explicitly addressed in ITQ systems. Similarly, artificial
enhancement or investment in habitat preservation may be collectively valuable to
the group of ITQ holders but difficult to initiate even when obviously efficient.
Many Chilean MEAs are engaged in various strategies aimed at rebuilding
stocks. In addition to rather traditional methods, such as self-imposed closed sea-
sons to allow natural restocking, some MEAs transplant organisms to areas of better
food supply. Some MEAs also control less commercially valuable species that repre-
sent the food supply for other more valuable species. For example, the highly
valuable loco positively selects prey species such as sea squirts and barnacles (Stotz
et al. 2003). Accordingly, some MEAs have chosen not to exploit these prey species
at all, extract them in very controlled quantities, or even increase their stocks
through repopulation programs.
The management of predator-prey relationships is rather rare in Japan, probably
because FMOs are formed around specific species. However, there are a few casesTURFs and ITQs 401
that have actually been implemented.12 On the other hand, a significant number of
FMOs are engaged in single-species aquaculture and habitat enhancement, both of
which benefit FMO groups focused on more intensive management. Naturally, these
operations are most likely to occur for sedentary species. The most prevalent aquac-
ulture operations are in abalone fisheries and kelp enhancement, with some also
beginning to occur for flatfish. Abalone is high valued, and typical operations grow
the spat out on shore facilities and then plant the juveniles in habitat thought pro-
ductive. Revitalizing the “ocean forest” of kelp and seaweed is also a popular
activity that aims to restore habitat for various species.
The Chilean legislation has recently been amended to allow fishermen’s organi-
zations to implement small-scale aquaculture projects within the MEAs boundaries.
To obtain the authorization to implement aquaculture projects, fishermen’s organiza-
tions must follow an intricate procedure and meet a series of requirements.
Preliminary evidence for sea urchin and scallop enhancement shows promising re-
sults regarding survival rates in some benthic habitats off the Chilean coast. Some
MEAs targeting scallops have even developed complementary industries that sell
excess wild scallops seeds collected within the TURF to other commercial scallop
aquaculture operations, further increasing the economic benefits to their members.
Additionally, as in the Japanese case, some MEAs are engaged in kelp enhancement
activities to restore benthic habitat for some species.
Marketing Coordination
Other tasks not easily handled by ITQ systems are those associated with product
quality, branding, and market timing coordination (Christy 1982). For example, ac-
tions that might differentiate a fish product, such as branding, involve up-front
investments in order to create a local public good; the free-rider problem may pre-
vent the initial investment.
The most frequently used collective activity in Japanese FMOs is centralized
and coordinated marketing. Most FCAs have a marketing organization that includes
an offloading and handling facility and sometimes trucks or a local retail market fa-
cility. This enables the FCA to maintain control over raw fish quality and delivery to
wholesalers and auction markets. In addition to providing handling facilities, many
FMOs also actively coordinate marketing in ways designed to enhance revenues to
FMO participants. Most smooth harvests by controlling effort patterns to avoid mar-
ket gluts, and many coordinate peak load harvest plans to accommodate special
marketing events, such as gift giving around the New Year period and mid-summer.
Most also coordinate quality control by setting size and condition standards, and
some finance vessel quality investments such as icing capability and hold design.
Some FMOs, such as the snow crab fishery FMO in Kyoto, have branded their prod-
ucts in order to gain a premium in the finely differentiated, sophisticated Japanese
wholesale and retail markets.
The Chilean MEA system has also encouraged fishermen to better market their
products to local and foreign buyers. MEAs have dramatically altered shellfish mar-
keting practices, away from unstructured, unpredictable deals to sales that are now
pre-arranged before shellfish are harvested (Parma et al. 2003). In addition, fisher-
men now make harvesting decisions for loco based not only on harvestable quantity,
but also on sampled measures of key indicators of quality and market price, such as
the average size of landings. They then use this information to negotiate with buyers
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and plan the harvest of appropriate loco sizes to meet buyers’ needs. This informa-
tion and negotiation advantage results in higher prices for their products. In
addition, some MEAs have agreed to pool a portion of their TACs to secure better
negotiation leverage. For example, 12 MEAs in the Fifth region have formed an ex-
port firm (marketing cooperative) for loco, limpets, and others products. This firm
exports its products to specific buyers in China, Taiwan, and Japan. Exploratory ship-
ments have also been sent to Belgium. In the last years, the marketing cooperative has
also exported live loco to China and Japan, obtaining very high per-unit prices.
Other Chilean MEAs have organized operations to create new products spe-
cially designed for certain niche markets. For example, several are working to
develop shore-based abalone culturing facilities.13 These utilize integrated local sea-
weed extraction operations for feed, and fattened adult abalone are sent directly to
the lucrative Japanese and North American markets.
Development of Other Ecosystem Services
Several Chilean MEAs are developing new companion industries that take advan-
tage of the fact that the MEA is granted rights to space rather than just a collection
of species. For example, one MEA near relatively wealthy towns has developed its
own fishermen’s market that includes lobster tanks with live fish and locally caught
fish and shellfish for portside visitors. The same MEA established three diving trial
zones within the TURF with different degrees of difficulty for Chilean dive tourists.
Fishermen also developed submarine charts to allow self-guided tours through the
diving trials. These marketing innovations would not emerge in an ITQ-based regu-
latory system, of course, because what makes them work is that organization
members have been granted rights to a piece of marine ecosystem space, rather than
just to the harvestable individuals within it.
To summarize, many of the collective actions mentioned above—effort coordi-
nation over space, pooling arrangements of proceeds, ecosystem management and
habitat enhancement, marketing coordination, development of ecosystem services,
and cross-TURF coordination—would not be likely to emerge under an ITQ system.
In an important sense, many of these collective actions have been initiated precisely
because access privileges to the resources within a unit of space have been granted
to groups rather than to individuals. However, the downside is that granting to a
group means that another administrative step is necessary to define conditions of use
for its members. The important question is how large the gains from additional coor-
dination are and whether they are large enough to compensate for coordination
costs. Coordination costs are the direct transactions costs of actually operating coor-
dinated activities. But there are also indirect costs associated with autonomy loss
and reduced individual incentives to innovate. How these shake out on net balance
is an empirical question that has not yet been satisfactorily addressed by economists.
Discussion
This paper is intended to provoke some discussion and comparison of two kinds of
rights-based systems, namely those that allocate harvesting rights on a species-spe-
cific basis to autonomous, independent individuals (the typical ITQ) versus the
13 Currently, there are industrial shore-based abalone culturing facilities functioning throughout the
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option of granting rights to a spatially delineated marine ecosystem to a group (the
typical TURF). As economists, we can speculate about this comparison by pointing
out that the extent to which the potential yields from the two systems are likely to
diverge is a function of the degree to which: (i) spatial heterogeneity exists; (ii)
there are important multi-species interactions among species of interest; and (iii)
there are other important ecosystem services not covered by the ITQ scope. In addi-
tion, however, the degree to which these two systems might diverge in practice also
depends upon the effectiveness of the group managing the fishing organization at
delegating, enforcing, and coordinating member activities. This is a much more
complicated question that researchers, including Elinor Ostrom, have been pursuing
for decades.
Our contribution to this long-standing question about collective versus indi-
vidual decision-making draws on some anecdotal evidence from two systems based
on TURFs, namely the Japanese and Chilean coastal collective management sys-
tems. The advantage of these examples is the breadth of cross sections. Each system
contains hundreds of variations, essentially numerous experiments on different kinds
of internal management methods. The examples run the gamut from those that are
close to laissez faire, to interestingly intricate examples of fine-scale coordination
over space and time.
In comparing these two case studies, there are some observations that are com-
mon to both countries’ systems. First, cases in which substantial amounts of
transactions costs have been incurred to squeeze rents out of a system seem to be
those with the highest inherent ability to generate returns from coordination and in-
tensification of management. Areas with high biological productivity that are close
to marketing opportunities and that are shared by a reasonably small group with
other labor opportunities seem to be most innovative and successful. Areas that are
either biologically or economically marginal are managed with minimal inputs and
coordination and are thus less successful. These results are what we would expect
from organization theory.
An institution common in both Japan’s and Chile’s TURF systems is the use of
pooling arrangements among fishing organizations. This is an ingenious institution
because it essentially provides counterincentives to the race to fish. In particular, if
one’s harvest is pooled, it does not pay to invest in extra capacity or expend waste-
ful effort. At the same time, the pooling arrangement generates another incentive
problem, namely the incentive to shirk. Our surveys have shown that FMOs and
MEAs use a variety of means to reduce shirking, including formal sanctions, peer
pressure, effort monitoring, and piece-rate payment schemes.
Another common aspect of collective management off Japan and Chile is the
use of Coordinated Effort Management (CEM). CEM involves having a committee
decide who is to fish where on a daily, or other regular basis. This is done for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is a means of ensuring more even spatial distribution of effort
for each species harvested. Individual rights-based methods do not solve the prob-
lem associated with over-harvesting of near-port, or high-productivity areas. CEM
generally involves assignment of fishing places in order to avoid over-harvesting hot
spots and allocations of some effort to other spots. The potential fairness problem of
being assigned poor areas repeatedly is generally resolved by either rotating harvest-
ing assignments, often in quite intricate patterns, or pooling the proceeds across all
participants. Second, in its most refined version, CEM may involve committee-level
decisions that trade off harvests of one species against others that may be linked in
competing or complementary ways. The movement of animals to different habitats,
repopulation programs, the addition of prey species, and habitat enhancement activi-
ties are all tactics that we would not likely observe in individual species-based
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Another tentative finding of our initial canvassing of FMOs and MEAs is that a
significant amount of the apparent rent generation that seems to have emerged from
rationalization comes not from input and cost saving, but from output or market
value improvements (Homans and Wilen 2005). In preliminary statistical tests, dif-
ferences in fishery performance attributable to FMOs seem mainly correlated with
marketing organization activities. Marketing organization, in turn, typically involves
market promotion, quality rules, market smoothing and harvest coordination, and
port delivery smoothing.
In summary, our preliminary examination of the Japanese and Chilean TURF
management systems provides food for thought about the possibilities for space-
based, as opposed to species-based, rights-based systems. The advantage of
space-based systems is that they make possible the elimination or mitigation of vari-
ous residual externalities that are not readily handled by species-based rights
systems. Chief among these is the uneven allocation of effort over space and time,
both of which are the focus of much collective effort in Japan’s FMOs and Chile’s
MEAs. We see evidence in both countries that institutions evolve to smooth effort
over time and space in ways that also manage inequities and perverse incentives.
The promise of mitigating these externalities comes at a cost, of course, since trans-
actions costs of coordination must be overcome. The fact that there is such a wide
spectrum of institutional evolution suggests that many factors condition whether the
potential for coordination-based rent gains exceeds internal transactions costs. The
trends in the development of the institutions that have, and are, developing are also
interesting. Japan’s system has devolved management into smaller specialized FMO
groups, whereas Chile’s system still focuses management on the entire marine MEA
ecosystem. Chile’s MEAs have been able, as a consequence, to implement certain
measures not commonly found in Japan’s FMOs, such as managing multi-species in-
teractions. But the Japanese system has been in existence for close to four centuries,
whereas the Chilean system is barely a decade old. This raises the question about
whether the natural end point of institutional innovation favors more intensive spe-
cies-focused management at the expense of system-wide management.
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